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PREEMPTION AND FEDERALISM IN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
PROTECTING SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS
TO VOTE, SELL, AND SUE
ROBERT B. THOMPSON*
I
INTRODUCTION
The legal rules of American corporate governance come primarily from
state law.1  The basic rights of shareholders relative to directors in the corpo-
rate entity have been determined in Delaware and the other states, not in
Washington D.C.2  Federal law supplements these state law rules principally
through disclosure requirements that are designed to increase the protection of
shareholders.  But, traditionally, federal law has not supplanted the share-
holder-director relationship as determined by the states.  It is a prime example
of “our federalism.”3
With the enactment of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of
19984 and other recent changes, the traditional description no longer holds.
There has been a noticeable expansion in the scope of federal regulation at the
expense of the states, at least as it applies to the role of shareholders in the co r-
porate form.5  Less noticeable is the shift, led by federal law, to a greater em-
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1. See, e.g., DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  (1993) (noting that “state law
is the heart and soul of United States corporation law”).
2. As students of corporations quickly learn, Delaware is home to more than half of the country’s
largest corporations and is the dominant state in corporate law.
3. See, e.g., Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Address at the American Law Institute Annual
Meeting (May 11, 1998), in LEGAL TIMES, May 18, 1998, at 12 (“It is a principle enunciated by Abra-
ham Lincoln in the 19th century and Dwight Eisenhower in the 20th century:  Matters that can be ade-
quately handled by states should be left to them; matters that cannot be so handled should be under-
taken by the federal government.”).
4. See Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered subsections of 15
U.S.C. §§ 77-78).
5. Legal regulation of director conduct remains almost entirely a function of state law with some
exceptions, such as the federal sentencing guidelines that relate to director conduct.  See In re Care-
mark Int’l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 969 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“The Guidelines offer powerful incentives for cor-
porations today to have in place compliance programs to detect violations of law, promptly to report
violations to appropriate public officials when discovered, and to take prompt, voluntary remedial ef-
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phasis on the voting role of shareholders relative to other shareholder func-
tions, such as selling or suing.  With the preemption decreed by the 1998 Act,
important parts of state law that address disclosure to shareholders can survive
only if the state law is more restrictive toward shareholders than is the federal
law, a reversal of the historical pattern that has characterized state and federal
roles during the twentieth century.
This article examines the changed roles of the state and federal govern-
ments in this new era.  Part II presents the traditional roles of the federal and
state governments in regulating corporate behavior.  Part III describes how that
traditional pattern has changed, in part due to elements contained in the tradi-
tional system that have not been clearly visible, and in part due to express fed-
eral preemption of state law contained in recent congressional acts.  Part IV fo-
cuses on where these changes have left us: with a greater dependence on
federal law, a greater emphasis on the voting function of shareholders, and the
likelihood of additional argument over traditional corporate issues such as the
internal affairs rule and the distinction between direct and derivative suits.
II
THE TRADITIONAL FEDERAL AND STATE REALMS IN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
A. The State Law Pattern
Under corporate law in all states, directors manage the business and affairs
of the corporation.6  Shareholders have only a limited role: They can vote, sell,
or sue.
1. Vote.  The shareholder franchise is a key part of corporate law, but that
does not mean that shareholders vote on very many things.  Most business
decisions are left entirely to the board of directors or those to whom they
delegate such authority.  Shareholders participate only infrequently in a limited
set of decisions, including the election of directors, fundamental corporate
changes, and ratification.
a.  Election of directors.  Directors are usually elected annually, but this
pattern can be varied by the corporation’s articles of incorporation or other
private ordering.7  Shareholders also have the power to remove directors in
                                                          
forts.”).  Note, however, that the relative rights of shareholders and directors are often reciprocal so
that expansions or contractions of the rights of shareholders by the federal government necessarily af-
fect the rights of directors.
6. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1991).  Also, stock
exchanges sometimes change the default rules provided by law (for example, by requiring a share-
holder vote in instances beyond those where it is required by state law).  These rules, as well as those
rules provided by contractual arrangement among the parties, are not addressed in this article.
7. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.05 (1990).
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some circumstances.8
b.  Fundamental corporate changes.  Mergers and similar transactions
require the approval of shareholders as well as directors and, thus, are an
exception to the usual rule that leaves corporate decisions entirely in the hands
of the directors.9  Of course, even here the directors act as gatekeepers: The
shareholders can vote only on those transactions that are recommended to
them by the directors.
c.  Ratification.  Shareholders occasionally vote on the ratification of self-
dealing transactions by interested directors.10  The vote can cleanse the
transaction of any taint or shift the burden of proof in a legal challenge.11
2. Sell.  The ability to sell one’s shares is a core right for shareholders and
one that corporate law has, for the most part, left to the market.12  Appraisal—
or dissenter’s rights—is a rare exception where corporate law guarantees
shareholders the right to sell their shares.13  Ordinarily, under corporate norms,
a shareholder must obtain liquidity not from the corporation but from the
market, if there is one.  That is not to say that corporate law does not assume
an important role for the ability to exit.  Free transferability of shares and
limited liability—both core characteristics of the corporate form—facilitate
liquidity through the market.14  Many corporate rules take their specific shape
because they exist in the shadow of a market for shares.15
3. Sue.  In addition to voting and selling, a shareholder’s ability to sue
serves as a constraint on the actions of managers and is a regular part of the
                                                          
8. See, e.g., id. §§ 8.08, 8.09.  Under Delaware law, if the board is “classified”—elected to serve
staggered terms—directors can be removed by shareholders only “for cause.”  See DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 141(k) (1991).
9. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 11.03 (1990).
10. See id. § 8.63; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1991).
11. See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 335 (Del. Ch. 1997) (discussing four logical effects of
shareholder ratification and noting that there are cases in Delaware that reflect three of those ap-
proaches).
12. See, e.g., CHARLES R. O’KELLEY, JR. & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 500 (2d ed. 1996) (“This exit right, in turn, makes a prospective mi-
nority shareholder contemplating acquisition of shares in a publicly-traded corporation less troubled
by the majoritarian-directorial bias of the corporate law norm.”); Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Ap-
proach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819,
833 (1981) (“All corporate statutes define the corporate skeleton in essentially identical terms . . . .
For the publicly held corporation, the markets in which the corporation participates—product, mana-
gerial, and capital—are the central determinants of that structure and behavior.”).
13. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 13.01-.31 (1990).
14. See Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV.
259, 262 (1967) (noting that publicly held corporations with many small shareholders could not exist
without limited liability).
15. See Gilson, supra note 12, at 839 (“Where incentive mechanisms created by one part of the
corporate structure—the various markets in which the corporation and its managers function—
constrain managerial discretion to perform inefficiently, one would not expect a different part of the
structure to provide redundant controls.”).
THOMPSON_FMT2.DOC 03/09/00  11:58 AM
218 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 62: No. 3
governance matrix.16  Litigation rights of shareholders include derivative suits,
direct suits and class actions, and inspection and other ancillary rights.
a.  Derivative suits. In particular circumstances, such as breaches of
fiduciary duty by those in control of the corporation, all states permit a
shareholder to bring a suit in the name of, and on behalf of, the corporate
entity.17  This type of suit is an exception to the usual rule that directors act for
the corporation.  It occurs when directors are disabled by conflict or are
otherwise unable to meet their fiduciary duty.18  In response to the fear that a
self-appointed shareholder would bring a “strike suit” to harass the corporation
or its directors, various procedural rules developed to balance the potential for
abuse against the monitoring value of such lawsuits.19
b.  Direct suits and class actions.  Shareholders can also bring direct suits,
which may be class actions if numerous shareholders are affected by common
questions.  In contrast to derivative suits, in which the loss to the shareholder is
derivative of the harm to the collective enterprise, direct suits may be brought
for an injury that the shareholder feels individually, such as deprivation of a
right to vote or a contract right.20  Such suits under state corporate law have
increased in recent years.21  They may be based on fraud under state common
law or on statutory remedies.
c.  Inspection and other ancillary rights.  Shareholders also have ancillary
rights at state law, such as the right to inspect the books and records of the
corporation, including the list of shareholders.22  Such inspection may be the
first salvo in a litigation battle, an effort to sell shares, or a voting campaign.
B. The Federal Role
1. As to Corporate Governance.  Federal legislation passed in the midst of
the Great Depression reflected dissatisfaction with the state law corporate
                                                          
16. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) (“The machinery of corporate democracy
and the derivative suit are potent tools to redress the conduct of a torpid or unfaithful management.”);
see also Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate Democracy, 23
GA. L. REV. 97, 140 (1988) (suggesting two roles for shareholders visible in the legislative history of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: as monitor of managerial performance and as an occasional deci-
sionmaker exercising limited control over corporate affairs).
17. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982).
18. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 (Del. 1981) (finding that a decision by in-
terested directors would not be respected because it is wrongful).
19. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42 (1990) (requiring that shareholders make demand on
directors).
20. See, e.g., Lipton v. News Int’l, 514 A.2d 1075 (Del. 1986).
21. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob: The Corporate Director’s Fiduciary
Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1087 (1996) (describing recent Delaware cases that impose a fidu-
ciary disclosure duty).
22. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 16.02 (1990).  See generally Randall S. Thomas, Improving
Shareholder Monitoring of Corporate Management by Expanding Statutory Access to Information, 38
ARIZ. L. REV. 331 (1996).
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governance system.23  In that same period, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means
wrote their well-known book, The Modern Corporation and Private Property,24
which detailed the separation of ownership from control in modern
corporations and called for additional legislation to constrain the discretion of
managers.  The congressional response, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(“the 1934 Act”), did not provide a federal law of corporations to replace the
state system described above, but it did seek to enhance shareholder rights,
primarily through disclosure.25  The 1934 Act reflects what I have termed the
“BASF model” of corporate governance, a term taken from the frequent
television commercials for the international chemical firm that say, in effect,
“We don’t make the cars you drive; we make them stronger.  We don’t make
the clothes you wear; we make them brighter.”  The approach of the federal
securities laws has not been to define or create the internal corporate
relationship between directors and shareholders, but to make that relationship
better for shareholders.26  For federal securities laws, “better” usually has been
defined through greater disclosure requirements.  Louis Loss, the most noted
securities commentator of the twentieth century, described the function of the
federal law as “disclosure, again disclosure, and still more disclosure.”27
Section 14 of the 1934 Act authorized the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (“SEC”) to regulate proxies, which managers used primarily to solicit
shareholder votes in advance of a meeting.28  The House report noted that the
section stemmed from a congressional belief that fair “corporate suffrage is an
important right that should attach to every equity security bought on a public
                                                          
23. Federal incorporation, which had been discussed as far back as the late 19th century, was pro-
posed again during the debate over the 1934 Act.  See 1 LOUIS LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 109
(2d ed. 1961).
The Roper-Dickinson Report of early 1934, which is part of the legislative history of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934, recommended federal incorporation as the most effective way
to deal with certain evils connected with market manipulation by directors and officers, the
issuance of stock to insiders for inadequate consideration, incomplete publicity of corporate
accounts and similar problems . . . [,] and others insisted that what are now §§ 12, 13, 14 and
16 of the 1934 Act—the securities registration, reporting, proxy and insider trading provi-
sions—had no place in a stock exchange bill and that the proper solution was federal incorp o-
ration.
Id.  See also Edward Ross Aranow & Herbert A. Einhorn, Proxy Regulation: Suggested Improvements,
28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 306, 306 (1959) (“Notwithstanding the basic importance of the solicitation of
proxies in determining the destiny of corporate management and affairs, and the temptations and
abuses which almost inevitably accompany unrestricted power, the states did virtually nothing to cope
with the problem.”).
24. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1933).
25. See Ryan, supra note 16, at 135 (“Congress was aware that the proxy regulation section of its
exchange bill extended to internal corporate affairs and that, at least to its proponents, this was neces-
sary and proper.”).
26. See Arthur Fleischer, “Federal Corporation Law”: An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1146,
1153 (1965) (“The federal securities laws affect a wide range of corporate activities, but generally they
do not preempt complementary state laws; they are pervasive, but not exclusive.”).
27. LOSS, supra note 23, at 21; see also LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION
29 (3d ed. 1989).
28. See  15 U.S.C. § 78n (1994).
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exchange.”29  As the Senate report noted, “[t]oo often proxies are solicited
without explanation to the stockholder of the real nature of the questions for
which authority to cast his vote is sought.”30  Thus, federal legislation was in-
tended to “control the conditions under which the proxies may be solicited with
a view to preventing the recurrence of abuses which [had frustrated] the free
exercise of the voting rights of shareholders.”31
The voting decision that disclosure supports is often the election of direc-
tors.  Many of the proxy regulations address the format and substance of proxy
solicitations relating to the annual election of directors.32  Much of the litiga-
tion, as well as the first Supreme Court cases addressing Section 14, concerned
proxies to solicit approval of a merger.33  These cases developed the core of
federal law and enhanced shareholder voting rights otherwise available at state
law.34
When hostile tender offers provided a realistic alternative to proxy battles
as a means to acquire control of a corporation, Congress extended the share-
holder protection just discussed.35  Again, shareholders were being asked to
make a decision without sufficient information.  Here, it was not a decision
about voting, but rather whether to sell their shares in response to a bidder’s
tender offer.
Federal law has developed more slowly to protect another shareholder deci-
sion arising out of a corporate change: a dissenting shareholder’s pursuit of ap-
praisal rights after a merger or similar transaction.  The Supreme Court left
open that question in Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg,36 but the four dis-
senting justices suggested that federal law protected that decision as well.37
Subsequent federal appellate court decisions have held that “a minority share-
                                                          
29. H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 13 (1934).
30. S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 12 (1934).
31. H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 14 (1934).
32. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(b)(2) (1998) (SEC Rule 14a-4(b)(2)) (form of proxy for elec-
tion of directors); id. § 240.14a-11 (SEC Rule 14a-11) (provisions applicable to election contests); id.
§ 240.14a-101 (SEC Schedule 14A, Item 7) (required disclosure for election of directors).
33. See TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (defining the standard for “materiality”
in lawsuits under Section 14a); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) (finding that mate-
rial misrepresentation in a merger requires only that proxy solicitation, and not a particular misleading
statement, be an “essential link” in the accomplishment of the transaction); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426 (1964) (recognizing for the first time a private right of action under the federal securities
laws; suit involved shareholders complaining of a merger between their corporation and another).
34. For example, the shareholder proposal rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1998) (SEC Rule 14a-8),
permits shareholder access to the company’s proxy solicitation statement.  Ostensibly, state law could
permit such access, but  state law precedent often does not exist.
35. See Williams Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454.  Analogy was also made to transfer
of control through the offer of securities in the acquiring company, which would require disclosure un-
der the provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 as an issuance of security.
36. 501 U.S. 1083, 1108 & n.14 (1991) (leaving open the appraisal issue because bank mergers,
such as the one at issue in the case, were expressly excluded from Virginia’s appraisal statute).
37. See id. at 1121 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The majority avoids the question of whether a plain-
tiff may prove causation by demonstrating that the misrepresentation or omission deprived her of a
state law remedy.  I do not think the question difficult, as the whole point of federal proxy rules is to
support state law principles of corporate governance.”).
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holder, who has lost his right to a state appraisal because of a materially decep-
tive proxy” may seek relief under federal law.38
2. As to Securities Transactions.  Apart from enhancing shareholder
governance decisions, the first Congress of the New Deal also enacted federal
legislation to regulate the purchase and sale of securities.  The Securities Act of
1933 (“the 1933 Act”) sought to protect those who purchased securities,
principally by requiring disclosure to those who bought stock in an initial public
offering.39  A year later, the 1934 Act, which regulated the proxy solicitations
already discussed, expanded federal disclosure protection to include sellers and
purchasers who traded in secondary markets.40  Although originally
overshadowed by the disclosure obligations of the 1933 Act, the provisions of
the 1934 Act have grown considerably, and this regulation is now the
centerpiece of federal securities regulation.  In 1964, Congress expanded the
disclosure coverage beyond companies traded on a national stock exchange to
include all companies that met minimum thresholds of assets and number of
shareholders.41  The mandatory disclosure required of those companies, now
found in Regulation S-K, has expanded to include more than forty items and
one hundred pages in the Code of Federal Regulations.42  Rule 10b-5,43 an
antifraud provision promulgated under the 1934 Act, has been interpreted to
expand the disclosure obligations of companies so that it approaches an
obligation to disclose any material fact.44
This disclosure regime at first glance seems market-based (that is, triggered
by the purchase or sale of securities) like the 1933 Act, rather than governance-
based, as are the corporate rules discussed in the previous section.  Such a mar-
ket/governance distinction has been attractive to some who advocated federal
preemption of the regulation of market transactions discussed later in this arti-
cle.  Yet, any clear division between corporate governance and regulation of
market transactions has blurred to such an extent that the line seems difficult to
                                                          
38. Wilson v. Great Am. Indus., 979 F.2d 924, 931 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Howing Co. v. Nation-
wide Corp., 972 F.2d 700, 707 (6th Cir. 1992); cf. Scattergood v. Perelman, 945 F.2d 618, 626 & n.4 (3d
Cir. 1991).
39. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77l (1994).
40. See id. §§ 78m-n (requiring periodic disclosure by companies with securities registered under
the 1934 Act and additional disclosure if proxies were solicited).
41. See Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).  The 1964 amendments applied to companies with one
million dollars in assets and 500  holders in a class of equity securities.   See id.  Under Rule 12g-1, the
minimum threshold is now $10 million.  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1.
42. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10-.911 (1998).
43. See id. § 240.10b-5 (1999).
44. Judicial interpretation has not gone as far as saying that there is a duty to disclose all material
facts.  See, e.g., In re Time Warner, Inc., 9 F.3d 259, 267 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that “a corporation is
not required to disclose a fact merely because a reasonable investor would very much like to know that
fact”).  Rather, the disclosure obligation has a series of triggers—periodic disclosures, proxy solicita-
tions, tender offers, initial distributions, insider trading, misrepresentations, and half-truths in volun-
tary disclosures—which, together with sometimes judicially imposed duties to update or correct, ap-
proach an obligation to disclose any material fact.  See id. at 270.
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preserve.  The transactions regulated by the 1934 Act are different from those
regulated by the 1933 Act because members of the protected class usually do
not transact with the issuer—the alleged wrongdoer—but rather with another
member of the public.  Disclosure obligations are imposed on the issuer, a non-
party to the transaction, to protect the parties’ investment decisions.  The du-
ties owed in that setting are not unlike traditional corporate law duties—albeit
usually imposed on the directors rather than the corporation—to protect other
shareholder decisions.  Damages, if any, usually are paid from the corporate
treasury, in effect from the pockets of the larger body of shareholders for the
benefit of a subgroup of shareholders.
Modern financial theory recognizes the direct link between market rules
and governance rules, in which the existence of market constraints can reduce
the need for legal rules of governance.45  Political scientist Albert Hirschman
noted the relationship between exit and voice: If investors are denied market
remedies, voice via voting or other political access will become more impor-
tant.46
3. Traditional Limits on the Federal Role Reflecting Respect for State Law.
For most of this century, there has been tension between the reach of state and
federal regulation of shareholder-manager relations.  Yet, at the federal level,
there has been continuous recognition of the limited role of the federal
government.  Congress has repeatedly refused to enact a federal incorporations
act, and federal courts often have restricted the reach of federal securities laws,
citing a desire to preserve federalism and traditional state regulation of
corporate matters.
a. Rejecting a federal law of corporations.  The supportive, supplemental
approach of the federal system to the rights created at state law is evidenced
both in the laws passed by Congress and in other proposed legislation Congress
chose not to enact.  Both the 1933 and 1934 Acts contained savings clauses that
preserved existing state law systems and remedies.47  These clauses most often
are discussed in the context of state securities laws but also are relevant to state
corporate laws.  Before World War I, there had been recurring proposals to
enact a federal incorporations law, made first by President Theodore Roosevelt
                                                          
45. See generally Lucian Ayre Bebchuck, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The
Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820 (1989); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1618 (1989); Gilson, supra note 12.
46. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS AND STATES (1970); see also Richard M. Buxbaum, The Internal Division of
Powers in Corporate Governance, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1671 (1985) (discussing the framework of exit,
voice, and loyalty in corporations and suggesting that the reduction of shareholder participation re-
flects judicial and administrative decisions on governance).
47. See 15 U.S.C. § 77p (1994) (“The right and remedies provided by this subchapter shall be in
addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity.”); id. § 78bb(a)
(“The rights and remedies provided by this chapter shall be in addition to any and all other rights and
remedies that may exist at law or in equity.”).
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and then by Presidents Taft and Wilson.48  Mention has already been made of
the debate over federal incorporation at the time of the enactment of the 1934
Act.49  In the early 1940s, there was another effort to enact a federal
incorporation law, which evolved later in the decade into the Model Business
Corporation Act, a basis for subsequent state statutes.50  In the 1960s and 1970s,
concern about the laxity of state regulation—highlighted by Professor William
Cary’s 1974 article on the race to the bottom among the states—led to
increased calls for federal regulation.51  Even the American Law Institute’s
Principles of Corporate Governance—later to be vigorously criticized as
making overregulatory suggestions for state corporate law—began as an effort
to minimize the need for federal corporate law.52  None of these federal
incorporation efforts succeeded.
b. Limiting broad judicial interpretation of federal disclosure laws.
Federalism concerns have also been prominent in judicial decisions.  In Santa
Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,53 the Supreme Court refused to include alleged
director misconduct within the fraud prohibited by the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-
5 when there had been full disclosure.  The majority opinion emphasized
judicial reluctance to interfere with state corporate law principles.54  The Court,
however, did not address how to resolve federalism concerns in the much more
common situation where corporate directors do not fully disclose possible
wrongdoing in the misuse of their position.55  A series of federal appellate cases
after Santa Fe held Rule 10b-5’s prohibition of fraud to include nondisclosure
or omissions that shielded alleged misuse of corporate position as defined by
state law.56  Placed within the structure suggested by this article, these decisions
                                                          
48. See LOSS, supra note 23, at 108.
49. See id.
50. See ABA Comm. on Corporation Law, Section on Corporation, Banking, and Mercantile Law,
Preliminary Draft of a Federal Corporation Act (Aug. 1943) (on file with author).
51. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663
(1974).
52. See generally Roswell B. Perkins, The Genesis and Goals of the ALI Corporate Governance
Project, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 661 (1987).
53. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
54. See id. at 478-79 (“The result would be to bring within the Rule a wide variety of corporate
conduct traditionally left to state regulation . . . .  Absent a clear indication of congressional intent, we
are reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transac-
tions in securities, particularly where established state policies of corporate regulation would be over-
ridden.”).
55. See id. at 475  (distinguishing a prior appellate case that “included some element of deception”
and noting that the Santa Fe facts contained full disclosure).
56. See Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 217 (2d Cir. 1977) (“Schoenbaum, then, can rest solidly
on the now widely recognized ground that there is deception of the corporation (in effect, of its minor-
ity shareholders) when the corporation is influenced by its controlling shareholder to engage in a
transaction adverse to the corporation’s interests (in effect, the minority shareholder’s interests) and
there is nondisclosure or misleading disclosures as to the material facts of the transaction.”); see also
Kas v. Financial Gen. Bankshares, Inc., 796 F.2d 508, 512 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Healey v. Catalyst Recov-
ery, 616 F.2d 641, 645-47 (3d Cir. 1980); Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Co. v. American Fidelity
Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 602, 613-14 (5th Cir. 1979); Kidwell ex rel. Penfold v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273,
1291-92 (9th Cir. 1979); Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236, 249-51 (7th Cir. 1977).
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interpreted federal law to protect not just voting decisions but also
shareholders’ decisions to sell their shares or to sue to enforce their rights.  The
Supreme Court denied certiorari in several of these cases and has yet to resolve
this issue.  Commentators have discussed the coverage of such “shame facts” or
“sue facts,”57 but cases based on this theory seem to be brought less frequently
today than in earlier decades.58  To the extent federal action intruded into state
law, it was consistent with other examples of federal intrusion that enhanced
the shareholder position.
Federal deference to state corporate governance law can also be seen in
cases such as Business Roundtable v. SEC,59 where the D.C. Circuit invalidated
SEC Rule 19c-4, which sought to deter companies listed on stock exchanges
from changing their corporate structure to include dual-class voting.  By giving
extra voting rights to one class of stock—likely held by management—the
changes had the potential to disenfranchise majority shareholders perma-
nently.60  Although such changes usually required a shareholder vote, the SEC
was concerned about possible collective action problems.  The SEC was also
concerned that existing safeguards would be insufficient if companies influ-
enced shareholders’ votes to change to a dual-class voting structure by offering
“sweeteners,” such as higher dividends on the limited voting rights shares.61
The federal appellate court struck down the SEC’s effort to protect fair corpo-
rate suffrage because it exceeded what had been authorized in the 1934 Act and
impinged on the tradition of state regulation of corporate law.62  The court fo-
cused on congressional regulation of disclosure and limited its disclosure dis-
cussion to one context: shareholders making decisions at a shareholders’ meet-
ing.63
Another area of restrictive judicial interpretation occurred in the 1980s and
related to the reach of the Williams Act, a 1968 amendment to the 1934 Act,
that regulated hostile tender offers.64  The Williams Act imposed disclosure re-
quirements designed to protect shareholders when they were deciding how to
respond to a tender offer for their shares.  When state legislatures imposed ad-
                                                          
57. See  Harvey Gelb, Rule 10b-5 and Santa Fe—Herein of Sue Facts, Shame Facts and Other Mat-
ters, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 189 (1985) (defining a “sue fact” as one material to a litigation decision and a
“shame fact” as one that would have shamed management into abandoning a proposed transaction).
58. See, e.g., Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1100 n.9 (1991) (declining to
use sue facts or shame facts as a basis for meeting the “essential link” of Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,
396 U.S. 375 (1970)); LHLC Corp. v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1988)
(noting that “[w]e have held repeatedly in recent years that the securities laws do not ensure that peo-
ple will receive information sufficient to make correct decisions about filing or pursuing lawsuits”).
59. 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
60. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice and Game Theoretic Approach
to Corporate Law, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 347 (1991).
61. See Exchange Act Release No. 24,623, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH)
¶ 84,143, at ¶ 88,773-74 (June 22, 1987).
62. See Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d. 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
63. See id. at 410 (“The goal of federal proxy regulation was to improve those communications
[with potential absentee voters] and thereby to enable proxy voters to control the corporation as effec-
tively as they might have by attending a shareholder meeting.”).
64. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(f), 78n(d)-(f) (1994).
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ditional, often onerous, requirements on bidders, the Supreme Court struck
down such state laws as violative of the Commerce Clause.65  The Court’s deci-
sion did not reduce the states’ desire to protect target companies from hostile
takeovers, and the legislatures returned to the drawing board and crafted sec-
ond-generation statutes that equaled or exceeded their first-generation coun-
terparts in their dampening effect on hostile takeovers.  The newer statutes
were framed as permissive authorizations of what corporate managers could do
in contrast to the earlier statutes’ restrictive limitations on what bidders could
do.
Several federal courts interpreted the Williams Act to protect a share-
holder’s ability to sell shares by defining the space within which takeovers
would be permitted to function unimpeded by state law.  A Seventh Circuit de-
cision emphasized that Congress, through the Williams Act, sought to preserve
a shareholder’s ability to receive tender offers through the market so that any
state law that blocked the use of the market should be preempted.66  The Su-
preme Court reversed that decision and interpreted the Williams Act as having
a limited purpose that focused on the conduct of the bidder vis-à-vis the share-
holders who were to receive the offer and not on the shareholder’s ability to re-
ceive an offer unimpeded by management defensive tactics.67  The effect was to
leave to state law the determination of what rights shareholders would have to
use the market as a means to constrain management prerogatives.
III
CHANGES IN THE FEDERAL/STATE MATRIX
A. The Expansion of Federal Remedies Even Within a System Acknowledged
Only to Supplement or Enhance State Law Rights
The creation of federal rights—even if only disclosure to make more effec-
tive the state law allocation of rights between shareholders and directors—
carried the seed of broader federal intrusion into corporate governance.  At
least three alternatives seemed possible to describe the relationship between
state and federal law: federal disclosure obligations, but no private federal
remedy; a federal remedy to replace a lost state remedy; and a separate federal
remedy for failure to comply with federal disclosure rules.
1. Federal Disclosure Obligations, But No Private Federal Remedy.  It
would be possible to have federal disclosure requirements but no federal
remedy, or at least no private remedy for damages.  Such a regime seems to
have been contemplated by courts before the Supreme Court’s 1964 decision in
J.I. Case Co. v. Borak.68  The required disclosure would make visible misuse of
                                                          
65. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 631-34 (1982).
66. See Dynamics Corp. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir, 1986), rev’d, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
67. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
68. 377 U.S. 426, aff’g, Borak v. J.I. Case Co., 317 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1963) (overruling the district
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director power that otherwise might have been invisible.69  We might expect
shareholders to use this disclosure in their decisions to vote, exit, or sue.
Practically, there would seem to be no way to limit their use of this disclosure
only to voting decisions.  Indeed, it seems realistic to recognize that this added
disclosure would aid shareholders in selling or suing.
2. Federal Remedy to Replace a Lost State Remedy.  If disclosure that failed
to meet federal standards led to a shareholder’s failure to take advantage of a
state-provided remedy, a limited federal remedy might simply replace the lost
remedy.  One example is inadequate disclosure that led a shareholder not to
exercise appraisal rights within the time allotted by state law.70  Of course, state
law itself could provide a remedy if fraudulent conduct induced shareholders
not to pursue these rights,71 but such state law has never developed very far,
perhaps because of the hostility to appraisal rights found in modern American
jurisprudence before the explosion of cash-out mergers in the last decade.72
Even this apparently limited federal right would present complications for
other shareholder decisions where the collective nature or other factors present
questions about the connection of particular shareholder action to the alleged
wrongful conduct.73
3. Separate Federal Remedy for Failure to Comply with Federal Disclosure
Rules.  The federal courts opted for neither of the more limited choices
described above but, instead, settled on a full, federal remedy when federal
standards were violated.  In part, this choice reflected an express rejection of
                                                          
court decision that a claim under Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act for damages and relief
other than declaratory judgment was a suit arising under state law); see also Dann v. Studebaker-
Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1961), aff’d, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (finding that federal jurisdiction
must end with the holding of a contested proxy action).
69. See Hamermesh, supra note 21, at 1149-50.
70. See, e.g., Pavlidis v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 737 F.2d 1227 (1st Cir. 1984)
(ruling against plaintiffs’ claim that they were induced to accept a merger by misleading proxy state-
ments that contained various misrepresentations).
71. See Smith v. Shell Petroleum, Inc., No. CIV.A.8395, 1990 WL 186446 (Del. Ch. Nov. 26, 1990),
aff’d, Shell Petroleum v. Smith 606 A.2d 112 (Del. 1992) (finding a disclosure violation when share-
holders challenged the adequacy of disclosure before their decision on appraisal and refusing to base
the remedy on the assumption that all class members would have sought an appraisal if the company
had properly disclosed all material information).
72. As originally conceived and until very recently, appraisal statutes served to provide liquidity to
minority shareholders who chose not to join the majority in a merged or reorganized business.  Ap-
praisal valuation and procedural rules erred on the side of making it difficult for these shareholders to
withdraw their capital from the corporation.  See Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Rem-
edy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223 (1962).  With judicial willingness to permit majority
shareholders to implement mergers as a way of forcing minority shareholders out of the enterprise,
appraisal has taken on a different role as a check on majority opportunism.  See Robert B. Thompson,
Exit, Liquidity and Majority Rule: Appraisal’s Role in Corporate Law, 84 GEO. L.J. 1 (1995).
73. See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).  The court of appeals ruled that
if the respondent could show that the merger had merit and was fair to the minority shareholders, the
trial court would be justified in concluding that a sufficient number of shareholders would have ap-
proved the merger had there been no deficiencies in disclosure.  See id. at 379-80.  The Supreme Court
objected because that standard would “insulate from private redress an entire category of proxy viola-
tions—those relating to matters other than the terms of the merger.”  Id. at 382.
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federalism concerns described by the Supreme Court in Borak: “And if the law
of the [s]tate happened to attach no responsibility to the use of misleading
proxy statements, the whole purpose of the section might be frustrated.”74
These federal remedies existed for each of the shareholder functions described
in this article: to vote (Borak and Mills),75 to sell (Basic),76 and to sue (Goldberg
line of cases following Santa Fe).77
These federal remedies existed alongside state remedies.  Often, the federal
remedy had to resolve an issue that would have been present in a state law ad-
judication.78  Not surprisingly, given the historical purpose of federal law to en-
hance shareholder rights at state law, the federal remedy often was more attrac-
tive to plaintiffs than the remedy available under state law.  For example, Louis
Loss observed that federal law effectively resolved the split of opinion on in-
sider trading and made the minority view on director duty the law of the land.79
Sometimes the federal remedy filled a gap where there was no state relief:
for example, the disclosure obligation established under Section 13 of the 1934
Act and expanded by judicial interpretations of Rule 10b-5.80  There are nota-
ble examples where plaintiffs simultaneously pursued both state and federal
remedies in suits related to voting,81 selling,82 or suing.83  Given the supplemen-
tal approach of federal law to state law, these federal cases had no need to dif-
                                                          
74. 377 U.S. 426, 434-35 (1964).
75. See supra notes 68 and 73 and accompanying text.
76. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
77. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) (discussing the causation issue
that would arise under common law fraud).
79. Traditional common law has often been described as having a majority view under which di-
rectors have duties only to the corporation, a minority view under which insiders are held to fiduciary
standards and must make full disclosure of all material facts when they transact with shareholders, and
the special facts doctrine, an in-between position.  See LOUIS LOSS, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 823 (1983) (“It does not seem too much to say today that the minority or trusteeship
view at common law has become, thanks to Rule 10b-5, the law of the land.”).
80. See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
81. In Borak v. J.I. Case Co., count one of the complaint claimed a breach of fiduciary duty to the
stockholders under Wisconsin law, and count two alleged a violation of Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act.
See 317 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1963), aff’d, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).  The Court of Appeals described the alle-
gation of count one as follows:
Case directors breached their fiduciary duty by approving and issuing a letter and proxy
statement of October 15, 1956, prior to the meeting at which the merger was approved, which
contained numerous material omissions and false and misleading statements relied on by
Case shareholders in approving the merger and without which the merger would not have
been approved.
Id. at 843-44.
82. Compare Pavilidis v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 737 F.2d 1227 (1st Cir. 1984)
(involving plaintiffs who claimed they were induced to accept corporation’s cash-out offer by a mis-
leading proxy statement containing various misrepresentations) with Coggins v. New England Patriots
Football Club, Inc., 492 N.E.2d 1112 (Mass. 1986) (involving plaintiffs who challenged the same trans-
action as a breach of fiduciary duty).
83. Compare Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955) (applying Indiana law and finding
a breach of fiduciary duty when a controlling shareholder sold shares for a premium that was not
shared with the minority shareholders) with Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.
1952) (rejecting a Rule 10b-5 claim that arose from the same transaction).
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ferentiate state-provided voting rights from exit or litigation rights.
B. The Growth of State Law of Disclosure
Even as the federal law of disclosure has expanded, there has been a paral-
lel growth in state law related to disclosure, particularly in establishing a share-
holder’s right to cast an informed vote.84  The disclosure obligations of directors
have been applied much more frequently in recent years, particularly in Dela-
ware.85  Thus, courts have defined a duty of disclosure—although they have not
always found a violation of that duty86—where shareholders are asked to vote
on a merger,87 sale of assets,88 amendment to the articles of incorporation for
purposes of a corporate reorganization,89 election of directors,90 and ratification
of a conflict-of-interest transaction.91
Disclosure obligations under state law have not been limited to contexts in
which shareholders are asked to vote.  Some Delaware decisions suggest a lim-
                                                          
84. See In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., 634 A.2d 319, 331-32 (Del. 1993) (“By alleged breaches of
duty of disclosure, Coca-Cola materially and adversely affected the minority’s right to cast an in-
formed vote. . . . It is a unique, special harm.”); Avacus Partners v. Brian, No. CIV.A.11001, 1990 WL
161909 (Del. Ch. Oct. 24, 1990) (noting that shareholders have the right to elect a board without unfair
manipulation); Spillyards v. Abboud, 662 N.E.2d 1358 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (noting that the right of a
shareholder to elect a board without unfair manipulation is an individual contract right).
85. See Hamermesh, supra note 21, at 1090 (“Of growing importance, however, is a state law duty
that courts have created and imposed upon directors based on their fiduciary relation to the corpora-
tion and its stockholders.  In the last twenty years, this branch of fiduciary doctrine has blossomed pr o-
lifically, particularly in Delaware state courts.”).
86. The Delaware statute that allows exculpation of directors, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)
(1991), has been interpreted as permitting exculpation of directors for breaches of the duty of disclo-
sure, thus narrowing the impact of the duty.  See Arnold v. Society for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d
1270 (1994).
87. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (noting that “one possessing supe-
rior knowledge may not mislead any stockholder by use of corporate information to which the latter is
not privy”); Smith v. Shell Petroleum, Inc., No. CIV.A.8395, 1990 WL 186446 (Del. Ch. Nov. 26, 1990),
aff’d, 606 A.2d 112 (Del. 1992).
88. See Schreiber v. Butte Copper & Zinc Co., 98 F. Supp. 106 (S.D. N.Y. 1951) (holding that a
challenge to a lease accomplished without consent of shareholders is primary and personal).
89. See Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., No. CIV.A.11713, 1993 WL 35967 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 1993).
Plaintiffs complained that proxy solicitation prior to shareholder vote on a dual-class proposal was
misleading because it did not disclose that insiders felt no fiduciary duty not to use control for personal
benefit.  See id. at *1.  The court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they were not shar e-
holders at the time of the challenged proxy solicitation.  See id. at *3; see also Margolies v. Pope &
Talbot, Inc., 1986 WL 15145 (Del. Ch. Dec. 23, 1986).  Plaintiffs challenged 18 deficiencies in a proxy
statement prior to a reorganization.  The court found that the proxy statement provided enough infor-
mation for stockholders to make their own decisions.
90. See Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 700 A.2d 135, 141 (Del. 1997) (noting that
“[t]here may be circumstances under which a proxy statement soliciting votes for the election of direc-
tors is actionable under Delaware law for material misstatements or omissions,” but concluding that
this was not such a case); Brody v. Zaucha, 697 A.2d 749 (Del. 1997) (finding no disclosure violation in
plaintiff’s solicitation of written consents for election of directors).
91. See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 334  (Del. Ch. 1997) (“To be effective, of course, the
agent must fully disclose all relevant circumstances with respect to the transaction to the principal
prior to ratification.”).  See, e.g., Reifsnyder v. Pittsburgh Outdoor Adver. Co., 173 A.2d 319 (Pa. 1961)
(involving minority shareholder challenges to the validity of a shareholder meeting resolution that
authorized the corporation to purchase stock held by the majority shareholder).
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ited disclosure duty regardless of any requests for specific action.92  In addition,
disclosure is sometimes used to support the effective exercise of the directors’
role in corporate governance.  For example, disclosure to a corporation’s board
of directors can change the legal test for finding that a director improperly took
a corporate opportunity in violation of a fiduciary duty.93  The Delaware Su-
preme Court modified the Chancery Court’s statement that such disclosure was
necessary to satisfy a fiduciary duty and, instead, made disclosure available as a
safe harbor that would defeat liability.94  Other courts95 and the American Law
Institute96 have made disclosure a separate part of fiduciary duty.
The expansion of state law of disclosure increased the interface with the
federal law of disclosure.  Given the long-standing tolerance of federal law for
parallel state law and the federal law’s basic purpose to enhance state law, this
emerging law provoked no extended federalism discussions.  Action by Con-
gress in 1996 and 1998 to preempt some state law changed that discussion dra-
matically.
C. Preemption
Congressional views of the benefits of federalism in corporate and securities
law changed dramatically in the late 1990s, when Congress enacted three new
securities laws within less than three years, a flurry of federal legislation in this
area not seen since the early days of the New Deal.  The National Securities
Markets Improvement Act of 199697 changed the roles of federal and state gov-
ernments in the registration of securities.  It reversed six decades of legislative
policy when it amended Section 18 of the 1933 Act, which, until then, provided
that nothing in the 1933 Act affected the jurisdiction of a state agency over any
                                                          
92. See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998) (“Whenever directors communicate publicly
or directly with shareholders about the corporation’s affairs, with or without a request for shareholder
action, directors have a fiduciary duty to shareholders.”).  However, this state common law cause of
action does not extend to suits for fraud on the market, which are regulated by federal law, and may be
subject to restrictions if brought as a class action.  See id. at 13-14; see also Marhart, Inc. v. Calmat Co.,
CIV.A. No. 11,280, 1992 WL 82365 (Del. Ch. Apr. 22, 1992) (finding a sufficient cause of action where
a press release was alleged to be misleading); In re Rexene Corp. Shareholders, No. CIV.A.10,897,
1991 WL 77529 (Del. Ch. May 8, 1991).
93. See Cellular Info. Sys., Inc. v. Broz, 663 A.2d 1180, 1186 (Del. Ch. 1995) (noting that a director
who seeks to exploit a corporate opportunity has an obligation to disclose it to the board for their ac-
tion; after-the-fact testimony that the board did not desire the opportunity “is a very thin substitute for
an informed board decision made at a meeting in ‘real time’”).
94. See Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148 (Del. 1996) (finding that a presentation to
the board “creates a kind of ‘safe harbor’ for the director, which removes the specter of a post hoc de-
termination that the director or officer has improperly usurped a corporate opportunity . . . .  It is not
the law in Delaware that presentation to the board is a necessary prerequisite to finding that a corpo-
rate opportunity has not been usurped.”).
95. See, e.g., State ex. rel. Hayes Oyster Co. v. Keypoint Oyster Co., 391 P.2d 979, 984 (Wash.
1964) (“Such a contract [between a corporation and an interested director] cannot be voided if the di-
rector or officer can show that the transaction was fair to the corporation.  However, nondisclosure by
an interested director or officer is, in itself, unfair.”).
96. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.05(a)(1)-(2) (1994).
97. Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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security or person.98  Until 1996, both federal and state regulatory systems ex-
isted side by side in the registration of securities, regulation of antifraud provi-
sions, and regulation of broker-dealers and others in the securities business.
Efforts to coordinate these two systems expanded over the years,99 but issuers
objected to having to submit not just to federal regulation but also to various
state regulatory systems wherever the securities were sold.  The issuers found a
receptive audience in Congress, particularly when coupled with arguments
about the growing internationalization of securities issuance and the disadvan-
tage to American companies in having to comply with regulations of multiple
American jurisdictions.100
In 1998, Congress took a second and larger preemption step by blocking
state law, antifraud class actions involving the largest American corporations.101
This step followed 1995 legislation that imposed limitations on class actions
brought under Rule 10b-5.102  When plaintiffs’ lawyers filed disclosure suits un-
der state law in response to the 1995 restrictions, members of Congress lost lit-
tle time in proposing new legislation to prevent such an end-run.103  As enacted,
the ban is broad:
No covered class action based on the statutory or common law of any [s]tate . . .  may
                                                          
98. Before 1996, section 18 read: “Nothing in this subchapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the
securities commission (or any agency or office performing like functions) of any State of Territory of
the United States, or the District of Columbia, over any security or any person.”  15 U.S.C. § 77r
(1994) (amended 1996).  After the amendment, the section now reads:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, no law, rule, regulation, or order, or other ad-
ministrative action of any State or any political subdivision thereof . . . requiring, or with re-
spect to, registration or qualification of securities, or registration or qualification of securities
transactions, shall directly or indirectly apply to . . . a covered security.
15 U.S.C.A. § 77r (West Supp. 1999).
99. See generally Mark A. Sargent & Hugh H. Makens, ULOE: New Hope, New Challenges, 45
BUS. LAW. 1319 (1990).
100. See S. REP. NO. 105-182, at 3 (1998) (quoting Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995:
Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban
Affairs, 105th Cong., 1 (1998) (statement of Steven M.H. Wallman):
Disparate, and shifting, state litigation procedures may expose issuers to the potential for si g-
nificant liability that cannot easily be evaluated in advance, or assessed when a statement is
made.  At a time when we are increasingly experiencing and encouraging national and inter-
national securities offerings and listings, and expending great efforts to rationalize and
streamline our securities markets, this fragmentation of investor remedies potentially imposes
costs that outweigh the benefits.  Rather than permit or foster fragmentation of our national
system of securities litigation, we should give due consideration to the benefits flowing to in-
vestors from a uniform national approach.
101. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227
(codified as amended in scattered subsections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-78).
102. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).  The 1995 Act made several important
changes that made securities fraud litigation more difficult:  It included a safe harbor to preclude pri-
vate actions based on allegedly misleading forward-looking statements, heightened pleading standards
to require specific facts to support a fraud allegation, and added a stay of discovery while the court
hears a defendant’s motion to dismiss.  See 15 U.S.C.  §§ 78u-5, 78u-4(b) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
103. See Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting State Securities Fraud Causes of Ac-
tion, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273 (1998).  But see Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal
Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1998) (questioning the
data that purported to show an increase in state-court filings).
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be maintained in any [s]tate or [f]ederal court by any private party alleging: (1) an un-
true statement or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale
of a covered security; or (2) that the defendant used any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.104
The ban tracks the language of Rule 10b-5, or at least as Rule 10b-5 is inter-
preted.105  The use of “covered securities” limits the preemption to those com-
panies with shares traded on a national stock exchange or comparable national
market.106
During the congressional debate over the bill, a “carve-out” was added to
preserve certain state law actions.107  Crafted by a group of experienced Dela-
ware lawyers, securities practitioners, academics, and SEC staff,108 the carve-out
limits the reach of federal preemption in two ways.  The definition of class ac-
tion explicitly excludes state law actions brought exclusively as derivative suits.
In addition, a separate section preserves state law actions in two kinds of cases:
(1) a purchase or sale transaction where one side is the issuer or an affiliate,
and the other side is exclusively holders of the issuer’s equity securities, and (2)
recommendations or other communications “with respect to the sale of securi-
ties of the issuer”109 made to equity holders by or on behalf of the issuer or an
affiliate concerning (a) voting, (b) acting in response to a tender or exchange
offer, or (c) exercising dissenters’ or appraisal rights.
The carve-out combines, in an unusual way, shareholder voting and exit
functions.  State actions alleging disclosure violations where shareholder voting
pertains to elections or perhaps ratification are not affected by the preemption
if they are not in connection with a purchase or sale of security.  Disclosure
challenges for other shareholder voting that are in connection with the pur-
chase and sale of security, such as voting or appraisal, are included within the
definition of preempted actions but are then preserved by the carve out.  State
disclosure actions relating to shareholder selling are similarly preserved if the
action relates to a tender offer, but if shareholders are affected by a similar dis-
closure problem in deciding to sell outside a tender offer, state action is pre-
                                                          
104. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 77p (West Supp. 1999).
105. The language of Rule 10b-5 is more limited as to omission, specifically prohibiting only half-
truths “to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statement made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.”  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1999).  Silence
when no prior statement has been made is not explicitly covered by the rule.  The new statute uses
“omission” without the qualifying language.  Under judicial interpretation of Rule 10b-5, omissions are
fraud only if there is a duty to speak.  See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).  This
language bans state law class actions based on omissions whether or not they are covered by Rule 10b-
5.
106. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 77p(f)(3) (West Supp.
1999).
107. See 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(1) (West Supp. 1999).  Class actions brought by states or state pension
plans were also preserved by this section.   See 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(2) (West Supp. 1999).
108. See David M. Levine & Adam C. Pritchard, The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of
1998: The Sun Sets on California’s Blue Sky Laws, 54 BUS. LAW. 1, 24 (1998) (“In order to preserve
these advantages of state law, a provision was drafted by an ad-hoc committee led by then-SEC Gen-
eral Counsel Richard H. Walker and consisting of certain members of the American Bar Association’s
Task Force on Securities Reform and the Delaware bar, as well as academics and SEC staff.”).
109. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1999).
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empted.  State class actions based on nondisclosure or omissions are preserved
where shareholder voting leads to a sale of stock (for example, a merger or for
similar transaction) but not where shareholder voting leads to election of direc-
tors or ratification of self-dealing transactions.110  State actions are preserved
where shareholders sell to a third party in a tender offer but not where share-
holders sell to a third party outside of a tender offer.
The preemption section is a substantive statement that shareholders should
not be able to sue directors through class actions under state law for disclosure
deficiencies related to how directors have run the corporation.  The carve-out
then preserves such claims for disclosure deficiencies if they relate to certain
voting and selling decisions, but not other shareholder decisions.  The justifica-
tion for such preemption is that issuers face the possibility of suit in numerous
jurisdictions, creating unnecessary costs to American issuers and too much
power for an individual state.111  The argument is that a shareholder’s right to
sue derives from the place of the transaction.  A corporation is unable to con-
trol the place of transaction—remember it is not even a party to many transac-
tions—therefore, a corporation could find itself subject to suits in multiple ju-
risdictions.112
Although proponents of preemption raise the specter of suits in numerous
states, the legislation seemed motivated more by the possibility of a conflicting
rule in one state: California, where Silicon Valley companies feared not having
the full protection of recent federal restrictions.113  It was unclear at the time of
the federal legislation whether California would actually have a contrary rule,
but there was little sentiment in Congress to postpone the use of the preemp-
tion club.114  The new federal law was more concerned with defining the limits
on shareholder rights vis-à-vis directors than adhering to a coherent federalism
policy.
                                                          
110. These results occur because the clause  “with respect to the sale” precedes and, therefore,
modifies all three forms of shareholder action specified.  Because an election of directors or ratifica-
tion is not related to a sale, it would not fall within the carve-out and would be preempted.  For exam-
ple, one part of the claim in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 890-93 (Del. 1985) was based on in-
adequate disclosure as to shareholder ratification.  That claim would be preempted.
111. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standard Act of 1997: Hearings on S.160 Before the Sub-
comm. on Sec. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong., 15 (1998)
(statement of Sen. Dodd) (“Without a national standard for liability, the potential threat is always
there that one [s]tate will change its laws in such a way as to become the haven for litigation.  This al-
most happened in California last year with Proposition 211.  The potential remains it could successfully
happen elsewhere in the future.”).
112. See id. (testimony of Daniel Cooperman, Senior Vice President, Oracle Corp.) (“As nationally
traded companies in a global marketplace it simply makes no sense for there to be fifty different state
laws applying to the buying and selling of securities.”).
113. See Painter, supra note 103, at 36 & n.183 (noting that 78% of the suits are in California).
114. See id. at 89 (noting that Congress interfered in an internal fight among Californians); see also
Levine & Pritchard, supra note 108 (suggesting that if Congress had just waited, issue may have re-
ceded).
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IV
OBSERVATIONS ON THE CURRENT SYSTEM
Corporate governance has now become a shared function between federal
and state governments in a way that places the current structure outside the
traditional legal pattern.  Delaware and other states still retain the primary role
of determining the authority and power of directors, and they retain a signifi-
cant role in specifying procedures for shareholder action, but the federal gov-
ernment has become the principal law-giver in determining what shareholders
do and in defining the range within which shareholders act.  The result is
somewhat jarring: Some shareholder functions are protected both under fed-
eral and state law; some receive protection from only one government; and a
third group of decisions receives little protection from either government.
The patchwork nature of current laws increases the likelihood of unin-
tended consequences.  The result suggests the aptness of the comments of SEC
Chairman Arthur Levitt, originally directed toward the dual system of state and
federal regulation of securities registration: “[It] is not the system that Con-
gress or the Commission would create today if we were designing a new sys-
tem.”115  Or it may be the predictable result when two governments share
power, and interested parties can lobby one government or the other to shape a
result more to their liking.  A similar process occurred elsewhere in the law of
business associations where interested parties lobbied state legislatures to cre-
ate new business organizations—the limited liability company and, later, the
limited liability partnership—to achieve limited liability and pass-through tax
treatment from the federal government for those who would not otherwise
qualify for that recognition.  In turn, federal tax rules determined the contours
of state law governance rules for these new alternatives to corporations.
Some of the confusion surrounding the current regime of corporate govern-
ance can be attributed to the historic way in which we have approached policy
decisions related to disclosure.  Milton Cohen’s observation of the 1933 and
1934 Acts has been much quoted:
[T]he combined disclosure requirements of these statutes would have been quite dif-
ferent if the 1933 and 1934 Acts . . . had been enacted in opposite order, or had been
enacted as a single, integrated statute—that is, if the starting point had been a statu-
tory scheme of continuous disclosures covering issuers of actively traded securities
and the question of special disclosures in connection with public offerings had then
been faced in this setting.116
Something similar could be said for the current topic: The structure of
shareholder disclosure would be quite different if we had started from the per-
spective of corporate governance rather than market transactions, with share-
holder decisions to sell—compared to decisions to vote or sue—as a particular
                                                          
115. S. REP. NO. 105-182, at 5 (1998) (Hearings on S.1815 Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Sen-
ate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong., 32 (1997) (statement of Arthur
Levitt)).
116. Milton H. Cohen, “Truth in Securities” Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340, 1341-42 (1966).
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example of governance rights.  Federal preemption of state laws regarding dis-
closure to shareholders can be more easily justified if viewed as part of a uni-
fied federal system that is designed to provide information to investors who are
making investment decisions on markets.  Individual states might lack sufficient
incentives to produce disclosure requirements in that context.117  On the other
hand, regulation by state law is more defensible if viewed as part of corporate
governance.  Indeed, as an alternative to preemption, there have been recent
proposals to let the state of incorporation determine anti-fraud disclosure re-
gimes.  This alternative would respond to the market-based concerns about
multiplicity of suits, but in a manner more consistent with federalism principles
than the preemption of the 1998 legislation.118  This part of the article describes
the current federal role and evaluates that role against the governance matrix
described in Part III.
A. The Emerging Dominance of Federal Law
Federal law has a broader scope than might be expected even given the
changes discussed above.  Federal law has gone further to define the space for
shareholder participation in setting the agenda of the corporation than a sup-
plemental role would suggest.  The emerging state law of disclosure defers to
federal law in broad areas, and recent preemption legislation has a broader ef-
fect than the presence of a Delaware carve-out would suggest.
1.  Federal Law Defining the Space for Shareholder Voting.  Even for
shareholder voting, where claims for state control are the most well-
established, federal law has made significant inroads in determining the
substance of the shareholder role in corporate governance.  State law provides
only minimal requirements for an annual shareholder meeting and shareholder
approval of fundamental corporate changes, such as mergers, after they have
been proposed by the directors.119  Under such a system, shareholders are
necessarily passive and reactive.  They are given no authority to initiate
corporate action or set the agenda.
Although most corporation statutes permit corporations to limit or restrict
the power of the board of directors and to thereby place power in the hands of
the shareholders, those changes to the statutory norms usually must be made by
provisions in the articles of incorporation.120  The board itself acts as a gate-
keeper for any amendments to the articles; shareholders have no authority to
initiate such changes.121  Shareholders in many states can directly change the
                                                          
117. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure
System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984).
118. See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107
YALE L.J. 2359 (1998); see also Perino, supra note 103.
119. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 7.01, 11.03 (1990).
120. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1991) (except as otherwise provided in the certificate
of incorporation); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (1990) (subject to any limitation set forth in the ar-
ticles of incorporation or in an agreement authorized under § 7.32).
121. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8 § 242 (1991); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.03 (1990).
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bylaws without going through the board as a gatekeeper,122 but there is a signifi-
cant question about whether bylaws can be used to interfere with a director’s
power—based on corporate law—to manage the business and affairs of the
corporation unless an alternative regime is set out in the articles.123
Against such a limited regime for shareholder action, federal law has
greatly expanded shareholder participation in setting the agenda for issues to
be voted on by shareholders.  Every year, hundreds of shareholder proposals
find their way onto the agendas for shareholders’ meetings and onto manage-
ment’s proxy ballots because of federal Rule 14a-8.124  The rule ostensibly per-
mits issuers to refuse to include individual shareholder proposals for any of
thirteen reasons; the first reason states, “[T]he proposal is not a proper subject
for action by shareholders under the laws of the jurisdiction of the company’s
organization.”125  Given the limited role of shareholders under state law, this
provision could exclude many, if not most, shareholder proposals.  The SEC
has passed quickly over any constraints that could arise from this limit in a note
to the rule pointing out the difference between mandatory and precatory
shareholder action: While proposals that mandate corporate action may be be-
yond the powers of shareholders, a proposal that recommends or requests such
action of the board may be proper under such state law.126  There is little state
law to that effect.127  Indeed, state law permits directors to prevent shareholders
from deciding on a tender offer, which likely will more dramatically affect
shareholders than will most shareholder resolutions.  Nor is there an easy way
to raise in court the issue of possible federal expansion of the law regarding the
                                                          
122. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.20(b) (1990).
123. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Bylaw Battlefield: Can Institutions Change the Outcome of Corpo-
rate Control Contests, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 605, 608 (1997) (“It would seemingly elevate form over
substance to permit shareholders to do by way of bylaw amendment what they could not do by way of
a shareholder resolution—use bylaw amendments to dictate ‘ordinary’ business practices of the corpo-
ration.”); see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Just Say Never?” Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Shareholder-
Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 511 (1997); Lawrence A.
Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws: Taking Back the Street?, 73
TUL. L. REV. 409 (1998); Jonathan R. Macey, The Legality and Utility of the Shareholder Rights Bylaw ,
26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 835 (1998).
124. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1998).
125. Id. § 240.14a-8(i)(1).
126. See id. § 240.14a-8(i)(1) note.
127. See, e.g., Carter v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 362 P.2d 766, 770 (Ore. 1961) (refusing to compel
management to include in a proxy solicitation a shareholder’s statement opposing management’s plan
to construct a dam after the shareholder’s attempt to present a resolution opposing the dam was ruled
out of order by the chairman at the annual meeting of shareholders: “We do not think that the pro-
posal in this case was one that was necessarily proper for stockholders to give an advisory opinion
about.”).  But see Melvin A. Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARV. L. REV.
1489, 1523-24 (1970) (“[T]hose who would deny shareholder access to the corporate proxy materials
for the purpose of including a proposal which is within the shareholder competence to initiate and act
upon, should be required to furnish a court with more than the Carter opinion if their position is to
carry the day.”); see also Conservative Caucus v. Chevron Corp., 525 A.2d 569 (Del. Ch. 1987)
(observing that, in the context of determining a proper purpose for obtaining a shareholder list, a
resolution is not improper merely because it requests the board to take certain action); Auer v. Dres-
sel, 118 N.E.2d 590 (N.Y. 1954) (ruling that shareholders may call a meeting to support an ousted
president even though they have no power to force his reappointment).
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role of shareholders.128  The result has been a significant expansion of the role
of shareholders; every year, because of those rules, shareholders vote on hun-
dreds of issues, from seeking annual election of all directors to not force-
feeding geese.129
2. State Law Deferring to Federal Disclosure Rules, Even for Voting Rules.
Even though Delaware has in recent years embraced a shareholder’s right to an
informed vote as an essential corporate right, its courts often have been
satisfied to let federal law determine the content of such a right.  Thus, when a
shareholder sought to obtain relief for incomplete and misleading disclosure in
a proxy that sought approval of a stock option plan, Delaware’s chancellor
noted that provision of a state law remedy for breach of a duty of candor “does
not mean that fiduciary duty of corporate directors is the appropriate
instrument to determine and implement sound public policy with respect to this
technical issue.”130  Sometimes this deference to federal law is practical given
the existing federal regulation: “We see no legitimate basis to create a new
cause of action which would replicate, by state decisional law, the provisions of
Section 14 of the 1934 Act.”131  Sometimes it seems more like an abdication:
“Neither the Delaware corporation code nor the common law suggests that
Delaware can or should pick up the perceived regulatory slack when federal
scrutiny may not include review of every actionable theory divinable by a
dogged plaintiff.”132
3. Federal Law Constraining State Efforts to Change the Matrix.  The 1998
federal legislation takes state deference a step further.  Even if the states want
to provide shareholders more effective disclosure rights, they cannot, at least
not via a class action.  One Delaware decision refused to find a state cause of
action because it would replicate Section 14 of the 1934 Act and concluded that
“[s]uch a result would represent a significant change to the existing matrix of
duties which governs the relationship among shareholders, directors and
corporations.  If such a change is to be, it is best left to the General
Assembly.”133  Congress has now taken some of that choice from the General
Assembly.  States are limited to providing disclosure for certain voting actions,
                                                          
128. See Susan W. Liebler, A Proposal to Rescind the Shareholder Proposal Rule, 18 GA. L. REV.
425, 459 (1984) (“Even though strong legal arguments can be made that the Commission has exceeded
its authority in promulgating the shareholder proposal rule, it is unlikely that any issuer would find it
cost effective to test this issue directly.  The direct costs of shareholder proposals are almost certainly
less than the litigation costs and costs associated with incurring the wrath of the Commission staff
which certainly would be visited upon such a deviant issuer.”).
129. See, e.g., Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 618 F. Supp. 554 (D.D.C. 1985) (involving a
shareholder resolution that condemned the practice of force-feeding geese to produce paté).
130. Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 332-33 (Del. Ch. 1997) (“An administrative agency—the
Securities and Exchange Commission—has a technical staff, is able to hold public hearings, and can,
thus, receive wide and expert input, and can specify forms of disclosure, if appropriate.”).
131. Arnold v. Society for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 678 A.2d 533, 539 (Del. 1996).
132. Malone v. Brincat, No. CIV.A.15510, 1997 WL 697940, at *2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 30, 1997), aff’d in
part and rev’d in part, 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998).
133. Arnold, 678 A.2d at 539.
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principally those for which the directors have been given a gatekeeper function.
If a state were to decide that additional disclosures were necessary for
shareholders to exercise their right of exit or litigation effectively, federal law
now prevents any such adjustment to the matrix of regulations, at least as such
rights would be enforced by class actions.
B. The Hierarchy of Shareholder Governance Rights
The various shareholder governance rights identified at the beginning of
this article—to vote, sell, and sue—do not receive equal attention in our cur-
rent legal regime.  Both state and federal law protect a shareholder’s right to
cast an informed vote.  Indeed, it seems to be the centerpiece for both systems.
The federal carve-out in the 1998 legislation preserves most, but not all, state
law authority to regulate voting.  A shareholder’s right to be informed in mak-
ing a sale or purchase decision receives extensive federal protection, although
noticeably less after the 1995 Act, but the federal government now bans states
from providing additional protection through class actions that the federal gov-
ernment does not provide.  The third basic shareholder function—bringing liti-
gation that will constrain management—is also excluded from state class action
enforcement of disclosure under the recent preemption legislation, but it re-
ceives little express federal protection.
This hierarchy may simply reflect a view held by both sovereigns that the
shareholder voting function is more important to corporate governance than
are the exit or litigation functions.134  More realistically, it may be a recognition
that law has a relative advantage in the area of voting and that markets can be
relied on to perform any needed monitoring of market transactions.  It may be
that voting’s preferred place in the regulatory hierarchy reflects a practicality:
A vote is a focused act more capable of being supported by disclosure obliga-
tions.  Yet we have a well-developed law on disclosure that supports sharehold-
ers making investment decisions to buy or sell so that the relative advantage of
law in the area of voting is not overpowering.
This preference, which is visible in both federal and state law, seems to exist
apart from any federalism concerns. Delaware case law regarding anti-takeover
actions has given corporate directors wide discretion in making decisions about
poison pills or other takeover defenses that prevent shareholders from making
an exit decision when responding to a tender offer.135  Delaware decisions sug-
gest that directors have considerably less room in defensive tactics that block
shareholder voting decisions.136  Corporate raiders unsuccessfully sought to in-
                                                          
134. See Hoschett v. TSI Int’l Software, Ltd., 683 A.2d 43, 44 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“The critical impor-
tance of shareholder voting both to the theory and to the reality of corporate governance, may be
thought to justify the mandatory nature of the obligation to call and hold an annual meeting.”
(citations omitted)).
135. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
136. See Blasius Indus. Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988) (holding that matters in-
volving the integrity of the shareholder-voting process involve considerations that are not present in
other contexts in which the directors exercise delegated power); see also In re Santa Fe Pacific Corp.,
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voke federal tender offer legislation to block takeover defenses that were por-
trayed as restricting a shareholder’s right to sell their shares to a tender offerer.
These narrow interpretations of federal tender offer law may be viewed as
resting on federalism grounds, demonstrating federal deference to state corpo-
ration regulation.137  More likely, it is a shared reluctance, found in state as well
as federal law, that law has a limited role in regulating shareholder decisions to
sell.138
C. Preemption Viewed in the Context of Shareholder Governance Functions
1. The 1998 Legislation as Part of Regulation of the Market Transactions.
Our current system of disclosure related to investment decisions arose from a
system centered on the regulation of market transactions.  The preemption and
carve-out contained in the 1998 legislation consider disclosure rules that affect
shareholder trading decisions as a subset of other disclosure rules that affect
transactions that occur across markets.  This view supports a broad reach for
federal preemption, using the market-based reasons previously advanced to
support the 1996 legislation: An issuer who is subject to liability for market
transactions cannot choose the jurisdictions in which securities will be traded
and is thus open to suit in multiple jurisdictions or at least any jurisdiction with
less restrictive standards than the federal rule.139
The preemption rule in the 1998 legislation presumes a bright line between
such market-based regulation and the traditional state regulation of corporate
governance.  Part II of this article sets out the contrary reality.  This part of the
article addresses more practical issues that can be expected to arise given the
market-based orientation of the new preemption statute.
a. Direct versus derivative suits.  Derivative suits are brought by a
shareholder in the name of and on behalf of the corporation.  Although
recognized as a bulwark against manager self-dealing, the possibility of a strike
suit by a self-appointed shareholder litigator has produced various procedural
limitations on these suits.140  A claim that directors have breached their
                                                          
669 A.2d 59, 68 (Del. 1995) (advocating enhanced judicial scrutiny to assure a shareholder vote).  See
generally Robert B. Thompson, Shareholders as Grown-ups: Voting, Selling, and Limits on the Board’s
Power to “Just Say No,” 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 999 (arguing that directors’ ability to constrain share-
holder selling decisions should parallel their ability to constrain voting decisions).
137. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
138. For an example of judicial reluctance to enhance shareholder selling decisions under state law,
see Colonial Securities Corp. v. Allen, No. CIV.A.6778, 1983 WL 19788 (Del. Ch. Apr. 18, 1983), where
the court rejected the plaintiff’s claim that characterized a severance benefit package as an effort to
emasculate the shareholder right to vote or to coerce shareholders to vote only for board-approved
nominees.  The court concluded that it would be unreasonable to view the complaint as anything more
than an attack on the compensation agreement, which must be brought derivatively.  See id.; see also
Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059 (Del. Ch.1985) (finding no contractual right to receive
takeovers where no shareholder presently engaged in proxy contest), aff’d, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
139. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 117.
140. For example, plaintiffs must make a demand on directors before proceeding with the litigation.
See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42 (1990).
THOMPSON_FMT2.DOC 03/09/00  11:58 AM
Page 215: Summer 1999] PREEMPTION AND FEDERALISM 239
fiduciary duty in the management of the corporation usually must be brought
as a derivative action.  Some claims, however, give rise to a direct action, such
as a claim that a shareholder suffered a particular harm from breach of a
contract right or loss of a right to vote.
Judges and commentators have struggled to set out a consistent theory that
separates direct from derivative suits, using the nature of the claim or the na-
ture of the harm, but always leaving ample room for judicial discretion and ar-
gument.141  Because the standard is vague, some cases have a decidedly oppor-
tunistic flavor as a party seeks to gain or avoid the results of one label or the
other in a particular circumstance.142
The disclosure cases often raise difficult questions of placement in the di-
rect versus derivative discussion.  Incomplete or omitted disclosure usually re-
lates to a voting or selling decision that affects all shareholders similarly, in
much the same way as the harm in most derivative suits.  But, because the dis-
closure violation relates to a shareholder decision to vote or exit rather than a
collective corporate decision, disclosure suits are often direct suits.  Usually this
determination is like a traffic cop directing a claim to either of two state law
causes of action.  With the enactment of the 1998 Act, the difference between
direct and derivative now has a federalism aspect.  Defendants will now have
reason to argue that shareholder claims are direct claims and are thus pre-
empted by the new federal act.143
b. Fiduciary duty and fraud.  Another distinction that will receive
renewed emphasis because of the new act is that between fiduciary duty and
fraud.  Director actions that breach fiduciary duties owed to the corporation
and shareholders often seem to overlap with fraud, particularly if fraud is
defined to include the more open-ended concept of constructive fraud.  Insider
trading has long straddled this division, sometimes viewed as a breach of
fiduciary duty and sometimes viewed as fraud.144  The corporate governance
provisions of the 1934 Act raise similar overlapping concerns.  It was this
                                                          
141. See, e.g., John W. Welch, Shareholder Individual and Derivative Actions: Underlying Rationales
and the Closely Held Corporation, 9 J. CORP. L. 147 (1984).
142. See Lipton v. News Int’l, Plc., 514 A.2d 1075, 1082 (Del. 1986) (Moore, J., concurring)
(“Through artful drafting, News’ complaint . . . appears to speak derivatively on behalf of the corpo-
rate enterprise, while subtly mixing in certain language upon which it now relies to stake out
‘individual’ claims.”).  Shareholders in a close corporation would usually prefer to have the claim char-
acterized as direct and thereby avoid the procedural complexity of a derivative suit, but plaintiffs or
judges sometimes adopt a derivative position, in part because it provides a vehicle for requiring the
corporation to pay the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees.  See F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON,
O’NEAL’S CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 8.16 (3d ed. 1994).
143. Some cases, such as the classic control premium case, Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d
Cir. 1955), permit direct recovery in a derivative case.  Where both direct and derivative recovery are
available under state law, there is not an immediate need to define the line between the two remedies.
After the 1998 Act, there will be times when direct suits will be preempted but derivative suits will not,
and we can expect much additional argument on issues like direct recovery in derivative suits.
144. Compare Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (discussing insider trading within the
context of fraud and using traditional fiduciary duty to define when silence is fraud) with Goodwin v.
Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659 (Mass. 1933) (discussing insider trading as a breach of fiduciary duty).
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overlap that provided the context for Justice William O. Douglas’s observation
that director misconduct and fraud are all part of a “single seamless web.”145
The Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Santa Fe was an effort to define
fraud narrowly under federal law so that it did not absorb what were also
fiduciary duty claims under state law.146  Corporate defendants will now seek to
reverse that argument and will broadly define fraud to include disclosure claims
so that their claims can be preempted by the federal legislation.
The disclosure cases, particularly those related to shareholder exit deci-
sions, raise a difficult question of categorization.  From a practical standpoint,
disclosure can be seen as market regulation, supporting and improving the de-
cisions of market participants, or it can be viewed as part of corporate govern-
ance, part of the duty owed to shareholders.  In recent years, the judicial role in
this overlap area has been considerably more active under federal law based on
fraud than under state law based on fiduciary duty.147  In part, the preference
for fraud is driven by who the defendant is.148  In a fraud suit, the corporation is
often the defendant; in a fiduciary duty suit, the claim is against the directors.
It may be easier to recover from the corporate treasury than to pursue individ-
ual defendants.  Also, the directors might be protected by exculpation provi-
sions, which are permitted in most states.  These exculpation provisions have
been held to cover disclosure claims, so that no recovery will be available under
state law against directors.149  But, on the same nondisclosure, a fraud cause of
action will permit a recovery against the corporation.150
                                                          
145. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 11-12 (1971) (noting that Con-
gress made it clear that “‘disregard of trust relationships by those whom the law should regard as fidu-
ciaries, are all a single seamless web’ along with manipulation, investor’s ignorance, and the like”
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 73-1383, at 6 (1934)).
146. See Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977) (“To the extent that the Court of
Appeals would rely on the use of the term ‘fraud’ in Rule 10b-5 to bring within the ambit of the Rule
all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a securities transaction, its interpretation would, like
the interpretation rejected by the Court in Ernst & Ernst, ‘add a gloss to the operative language of the
statute quite different from its commonly accepted meaning.’”).
147. See LEWIS D. SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORATIONS LAW & POLICY 884 (4th ed. 1998).
148. The identity of the defendant also determines the exclusivity of the appraisal remedy in corpo-
rate law.  Suits based on breach of fiduciary duty have long been a basis for claims of misuse of major-
ity power in the context of a merger or other fundamental corporate change.  Some state courts have
held that the appraisal remedy can provide all the protection needed for minority shareholders.  See
Stringer v. Car Data Systems, Inc., 841 P.2d 1183 (Or. 1992) (“Cases such as these are the very kind
addressed by the statutory scheme.”).  Delaware continues to permit alternative actions, in part be-
cause appraisal is a limited suit against the corporation, and the corporation’s valuation necessarily
cannot include damages from directors’ breaches of fiduciary duty.  See Ceder Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.,
542  A.2d 1182, 1189-90 (Del. 1998) (“A determination of fair value does not involve an inquiry into
claims of wrongdoing on the merger.”).  California and other states assert that appraisal can do that.
See Steinberg v. Amplica, Inc., 729 P.2d 683, 690 (Ca. 1987) (“We see nothing in the appraisal statutes
to prevent vindication of a shareholder’s claim of misconduct in an appraisal proceeding.”).
149. See Arnold v. Society for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270 (Del. 1994) (ruling that the excul-
pation provision in the corporate charter covered a claim that was based on a director’s alleged breach
of duty to disclose all facts relating to a merger).
150. A Delaware court has suggested another way of drawing the line:  Suits against directors are
brought under fiduciary duty; state law suits against the corporation based upon breach of fiduciary
duty must be predicated on legal or equitable fraud.  See In re Dataproducts Corp., No. CIV.A.11164,
1991 WL 165301, at *6 (Del. Ch. Aug. 22, 1991) (reasoning that this is “not to say that a corporation
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2. Disclosure as Part of Corporate Governance.  There is an alternative to
the market-based preemption described above that does not include its vague
overlaps and greater federal presence.  Disclosure regulation of exit
transactions is one of several shareholder functions that are part of corporate
governance.  State corporate law could regulate this function as it does other
functions of the state corporate governance process.  Indeed, recent proposals
recognize that this type of regulation of market transactions can be placed
within the traditional governance structure.151  Such a proposal offers a ready
solution to the problem of multiple states asserting jurisdiction and the
negative impact on companies that compete in international markets.  As is
true in corporate governance generally, a suit could be brought only under the
law of the state of incorporation.  At that point, the market-based justification
for preemption loses its power.  One side effect, albeit probably positive, is the
further withering away of the “pseudo-foreign” corporation doctrine, by which
a state other than the state of incorporation asserts jurisdiction based on the
shareholders’ citizenship and residence within the state.152  This doctrine is
subject to arguments similar to the market-oriented preemption argument that
was made to support the 1998 Act because it opens up the possibility of suits in
multiple jurisdictions and it can be a way to avoid a substantive rule of the state
of incorporation.  The 1998 Act lands a telling, although largely unnoticed,
blow against pseudo-foreign corporations by permitting direct suits arising only
under the state of organization.153
Viewing disclosure for shareholder trading decisions as within the umbrella
of the overall regulation of corporate governance is more likely to foster a con-
scious weighing of the relative merits of the various shareholder functions.  It is
also likely to encourage a more comprehensive development of the discussion
of direct versus derivative suits and the overlap between fraud and fiduciary
duty.154
                                                          
owes no duty or can never be liable under Delaware law if it promulgates false and misleading disclo-
sures to its shareholders.  Rather, it means that under Delaware law any disclosure duty owed by the
corporation to its shareholders must be predicated upon a theory of legal or equitable fraud.”).  What-
ever the validity of the distinction, such a suit, if direct, would seem to be preempted by the 1998 leg-
islation.  See Hamermesh, supra note 21, at 1174 (noting that directors have no recognized function to
manage information to permit intelligent stock-related decisions by one segment of market—existing
shareholders—and distinguishing state law from what is historically federal law).
151. See Romano, supra note 118 (urging disclosure choice for public issuers in both primary and
secondary markets and one sovereign with jurisdictions over all transactions in the securities of a cor-
poration); see also Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 1 (arguing that issuers should be able to choose the nature and level of ex ante disclosure
to investors with mandatory Rule 10b-5 liability, but secondary market requirements and liability
should be different because of reduced incentives and constraints for management disciplining).
152. See CALIF. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West Supp. 1999).
153. See S. REP. NO. 105-182, at 6 (1998) (“[T]he Committee expressly does not intend for suits ex-
cepted under this provision to be brought in venues other than in the issuer’s state of incorporation, in
the case of a corporation, or state of organization, in the case of another entity.”).
154. See Painter, supra note 103, at 52 (noting that state law filing avoids having to make a sharp
distinction between fiduciary duty and fraud).
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CONCLUSION
The relationship between shareholders and directors within a corporation,
long thought to be within the domain of state law, now has a dominant federal
aspect.  Federal law, whose original role was limited to making shareholder
voting more effective through disclosure, now defines a broad range of share-
holder rights vis-à-vis directors.  Federal law permits shareholders to determine
the corporate agenda beyond any rights contemplated by state law.  State law
now defers to federal law even on core disclosure questions about voting.  Fed-
eral law now preempts any competing state law via class actions regarding dis-
closure that shareholders may need to exercise their core governance functions
of exit and litigation.
We have lost any sort of firebreak to preserve federalism in corporate
regulation.155  The division between federal and state regulation now seems to
turn on the substantive result that Congress desires rather than on any deter-
mination of which corporate functions are better performed by state govern-
ments in our federal system.  If there is any real concern about federalism, it is
possible to address the multijurisdictional problems that seem to have moti-
vated the 1998 Act while still preserving state regulation of corporate govern-
ance by simply extending the internal affairs doctrine to include all shareholder
functions.  This approach has the added advantage of being less likely to spur
growth in extraneous issues, such as whether a suit must be direct or derivative,
or possible differences between fiduciary duty and fraud.  This alternative solu-
tion prefers federalism, and it does not require the federal government to de-
termine the substantive rules.  In adopting a contrary approach, it seems that
the real focus of the 1998 Act was to prevent any alternative state rule more fa-
vorable to shareholders.156  That goal, while certainly within the range of sub-
stantive rules that might be adopted, suggests that we have taken another large
step toward a federal corporations law.
                                                          
155. See Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 413 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ( “If the Commission’s one
share/one vote rule is to survive, then some kind of firebreak is needed to separate it from corporate
governance as a whole.”).
156. The removal provision in the 1998 Act—which allows federal courts to interpret the scope of
preemption and to use the stay of discovery of the Reform Act—seems to suggest a distrust of state
courts and a focus on ensuring that the substance of the rule was changed, with little concern for fede r-
alism.
